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Abstract
We study the impact of planned age at marriage on female educa-
tion. We first develop a theoretical framework for jointly determining
age at marriage and education. The framework hypothesises that due
to a household division of labour that allocates relatively greater re-
sponsibility for housework on wives, parents discount their daughters’
schooling, with the discount increasing the earlier the planned age
of marriage. We then test for this effect using household data from
Nepal. We control for potential endogeneity by exploiting variations
in cultural norms regarding dowry and differences in average age of fe-
male marriage among ethnicities and regions as instrumental variables.
The econometric results validate our hypothesis that female education
is negatively affected by cultural practices that favour early marriage.
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1 Introduction
Despite a considerable number of socio-economic benefits that have been
attributed to female education (Bayisenge, 2010), females fall behind males
in educational attainment in many parts of the world, with the gap increas-
ing in the level of education. The problem is particularly severe in South
Asia, where the Gender Parity Index (GPI), which measures the female to
male ratio in education, is significantly low. In this region, the GPI for
pre-primary, primary, secondary and upper secondary level enrollment is,
respectively, .98, .86, .83 and .75 whereas the global average for the same
measures stands at .99, .93 , .93 and .92, respectively. All countries in this
region, apart from Sri Lanka and Maldives, lag far behind the global average
of girl’s school enrollment and this gap increases with levels of schooling (see
Table 1).
Existing empirical studies on the gender gap in education can be divided
into two strands. The first focuses on household characteristics, such as
economic status and parental education, and how these influence gender
preferences in schooling. In general these studies find that poverty, lack
of social security, credit markets and low levels of parental education all
contribute to gender biases in education.1 The second strand takes into
account gender differences in labor market outcomes, especially with respect
1See, e.g., Jacoby and Skoufias (1997), Cameron and Worswick (2001), Sawada (1997).
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to returns to education.2
An important unexplored dimension of the gender gap in education is
marriage. In Asian (particularly South Asian) cultures parents consider a
daughter’s marriage to be one of the family’s main milestones and start
planning for it years in advance.3 Not much attention has been paid to
how parental plans regarding a daughter’s marriage might influence their
decisions regarding her education. On the theoretical side, some papers have
argued that the prospect of marriage alone biases parents against educating
their daughters. Lahiri and Self (2007) analyse the impact of patrilocality in
post-marital living arrangements on female education. Patrilocality, which
is especially widespread in South Asian countries, leads to the anticipation
that a daughter’s future earnings will accrue to her in-laws’ household rather
than her natal household and this discourages investment in her education.
Jafarey (2011) argues that due to gender wage inequality in labour markets,
the marital division of labor will encourage lead to female’s shouldering
a larger share of responsibility for housework and the anticipation of this
2The seminal paper of this strand is Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982). However, the
literature has produced mixed results on the pure returns to female education. While,
e.g. Kingdom (1998) found on the basis of data from Uttar Pradesh, India that girls face
lower economic rate of returns to education, Aslam (2009), Behrman and Deolalikar (1995),
Asadullah (2006) found the opposite for, respectively, Pakistan, Indonesia and Bangladesh.
Moreover, Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) found that traditional caste restrictions on
occupational mobility can restrict boys’ occupational choices and therefore the quality of
their education more than that of girls. Thus labour market outcomes do not present an
unambiguous explanation for the gender gaps in female education that are observed at
the national level in South Asian countries.
3A common metaphor in Urdu, the main language of Pakistan, for someone being
sound asleep is “he/she is sleeping like he/she has just married off all his/her daughters”.
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effect will discontinuously lower the value of her education relative to her
hypothetical single self.
Following Becker’s seminal work (Becker, 1973) an empirical literature
has developed in which marital decisions are treated as endogenous and
their determinants studied. However, to our knowledge, few empirical pa-
pers, Brien and Lillard (1994), citeMenschSinghCasterline06 and Field and
Ambrus (2008), have so far studied the interaction between marriage and
female education. The first study uses empirical evidence from Malaysia to
study the role of education and enrollment in delaying marriage and first
conception, and the role of marriage in delayed first conception and drop-
ping out of school. The second of these evaluates the effect of schooling on
age at first marriage. Looking at evidence from 73 developing countries,
Mensch, Singh, and Casterline (2006) found that the expansion of schooling
has led to a proportional increase in the age at first marriage for females
but did not find a similar result for males. The paper, however, did not
consider the reverse effect from age at marriage to education. Field and
Ambrus (2008) looked at the effect of early marriage on female schooling
and other adult outcomes in Bangladesh. They argue that in impoverished
and culturally traditional societies parents have an incentive to marry their
daughters young as a form of protection against economic vulnerability. The
age of menarche imposes a constraint on how early girls can be married. The
authors use the timing of menarche as an instrument in identifying the im-
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pact of early marriage on female schooling. They find that early marriage
significantly lowers female schooling and that each year’s delay in marriage
would increase female schooling by 0.22 years.
Although an important step in isolating the effects of age at marriage
on female education, the relevance of menarche as an instrumental vari-
able to determine the age at marriage is limited to social settings in which
child marriage is prevalent. While this might be true of Bangladesh, it is
not necessarily true of other South Asian countries.4 Moreover, while child
marriage directly hinders a female’s schooling by imposing household duties
at a young age, our concern is with the indirect disincentive to female educa-
tion that marriage exerts, via its implied division of labour, and this applies
even to females who marry post-childhood. Once a woman gets married, her
burden of household duties increases. Thus, even if a female gets married
after the normal age for a particular level of schooling, the sooner she plans
to marry after reaching that age, the less likely that she will attain that level
in the first place.
Our paper contributes to the analysis of the above effect by first out-
lining a theoretical framework for jointly determining female education and
planned age at marriage. The framework is based on Jafarey (2011), in
4A report published by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) shows that
Bangladesh has a considerably higher ratio of females marrying below the age of 15 years
than the other countries in this region. While in Bangladesh, approximately 30% of
married females from the age group 20-24 were married below the age of 15, in India
the corresponding figure was 18%. The same measure stood at less than 10% in Nepal,
Pakistan and Sri Lanka (Asadullah, 2011).
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which gender wage inequality is shown to lead to both a direct discount on
female education and an indirect one following from the marital division of
labour which allocates women to spend relatively more time in housework
and men in market work. We show that the indirect discount decreases
with the anticipated age of marriage of a female. We further show that the
age at marriage can itself depend on individual and cultural factors, such
as a female’s ability to benefit from schooling and/or cultural expectations
regarding an ideal age for her to marry.
We then study the causal effect of age at marriage on female education
using data from a household survey in Nepal. Since our theoretical frame-
work suggests that females may select into early marriage on the basis of
idiosyncratic and unobservable differences in ability, it cautions us that least-
squares estimates will be potentially biased. We thus use an instrumental
variables strategy using household data from Nepal.
Nepal is well suited for our study because it has considerable variation
in age at first marriage across ethnic groups and regions. In particular,
members of the Maithili community, which is concentrated in the regions
bordering India, have been identified by ethnographers as practicing an ex-
ceptionally strict version of dowry culture. Their particular dowry practice,
locally known as Tilak Pratha, is effectively a groom price that increases with
the educational qualification and social standing of the groom (Das, 2009).
One reason for the strong adherence of the Maithilis to this practice is their
6
geographical and cultural proximity to India, where groom price dowries
are more prevalent than amongst other communities of Nepal. Empirical
findings from India also suggest a positive correlation between the size of
the dowry and the socioeconomic standing of the prospective husband (Je-
jeebhoy and Halli, 2006). The result of Tilak Pratha is that parents try to
get their daughters married as soon as possible because older girls are more
likely to match with more mature and well-educated boys, putting upward
pressure on the amount of dowry.
One of our instruments is therefore a dummy variable indicating mem-
bership of the Maithili community. Our own data show that 63% of Maithili
girls were married by the age of 16, compared with 41% of non-Maithali girls
(see Table 4). These differences are significant even at the 1% level, and are
prime facie evidence that Tilak Pratha influences marital behavior in Nepal
within the Maithali community. Our second instrument is the average age
at marriage of the region and ethnicity which the married woman belongs to.
The instruments are only valid if, conditional on all other covariates, they
affect age of marriage but do not have other direct effect on education, such
as a particular attitude towards female education. We argue that the set
of conditioning covariates, and in particular mother’s education, contains a
coarser set of information regarding family level attitudes towards education,
and both the Maithili community dummy variable and the region-ethnicity
average are valid instrumental variables. This is especially true in the South
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Asian region where marriage predominantly happens within communities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
theoretical framework. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 explains the
econometric model. Section 5 reports the empirical results. The last section
concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
In this section we outline a framework for jointly determining a female’s
education and her planned age at marriage. Suppose that a female, indexed
by i, is poised to enter adulthood. She has already gone through a period
of childhood, in which she has received a level of education, ei, which for
theoretical purposes, is a non-negative, continuous variable. Suppose that
her childhood education affects only her adult welfare. In other words, any
costs (either explicit or in terms of foregone opportunities) or benefits from
education have no effect on her as a child.
Suppose that her time in adulthood is continuous and normalised to
the unit interval and that within this interval, she goes through two sub-
intervals, single and married. Let ti < 1 be the point of time when she
marries, thus it is also the length of time she spends as single and 1 − ti is
the length of time she is married.5
Following from the above, assume that adult utility can be described by
5We rule out alternating stages of matrimonial status as could happen with divorce or
widowhood.
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an indirect utility function, V , that varies with each sub-interval of adult
life:
V ji = V (ei, X
j
i , Zi),
where V ji is her utility in each stage j, j = (s,m), s = single and m =
married; ei is her educational level, X
j
i is a set of household, community and
environmental characteristics specific to stage j in i’s life, and Zi is a set of
factors that are common to both stages in i’s adulthood. Zi could index her
ability to benefit from education and convert it into market earnings as well
as the innate attitudes of her family and community towards her marriage
age and her education. Note that since ei is determined before reaching
adulthood, it is not indexed by j. We assume that V ji is increasing in ei at
ei = 0, concave in ei, and reaches a maximum at some stage-specific level
of education, e¯ji > 0. We also assume that e¯
s
i > e¯
m
i for all i.
6 The last two
assumptions are needed to ensure an interior optimum for ei.
In addition, we assume that there exists a social norm regarding the ideal
age of marriage. Let this be denoted by t∗, which applies to all females.7
6We base these assumption on Jafarey (2011) where childhood time is explicitly mod-
elled as a choice between developing labour market skills and household skills. While the
former requires only schooling time as an input, the latter requires an optimal mix of time
in school and time spent at home acquiring domestic training. Too much or too little
schooling can result in sub-optimal levels of household skill and this in turn leads to a
inverted U-shaped relationship between V j and e. Since we assume, also based on Jafarey
(2011), that a female’s burden of housework increases after marriage, this leads to the
implication that e¯s.e¯m.
7In order to economise on notation, we have left implicit an additional feature of our
framework which will be used in the empirical part. That is that each female belongs to
some reference group, which determines her own ideal age at marriage. But this ideal
might vary from group to group.
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Marrying sooner or later than this ideal imposes utility costs in the form of
‘loss of face’. There is a long-standing literature in both demography and
sociology that have investigated the existence of social and cultural norms
regarding age at marriage. While sociologists such as Settersten and Hages-
tad (1996) and Neugarten, Moore, and Lowe (1965) were interested in the
broader issue of age norms for various “life-course” transitions, demogra-
phers are specifically interested in age at marriage and the length of the
reproductive cycle in women (see Billari, Prskawetz, and Furnkranz, 2002)
. Both Neugarten, Moore, and Lowe (1965) and Billari, Prskawetz, and
Furnkranz (2002) discuss survey evidence on the existence of popular per-
ceptions regarding ideal ages and/or age limits for marriage, the latter from
1960’s USA and the former from 1990’s Italy. 8
With this added assumption, her indirect utility can be expressed as
Vi = tiV
s
i (ei, X
s
i , Zi) + (1− ti)V
m
i (ei, X
m
i , Zi)− δ(ti − t
∗)2,
which is maximised by the appropriate choice of ei and ti.
Her educational choice is characterised by the following first order condi-
8According to the data cited by Billari, Prskawetz, and Furnkranz (2002), older women
perceived age limits for marriage more frequently than younger ones and all age groups
believed more strongly in a minimum age than a maximum. For example, 11% of women
born between 1945-1947 believed in an upper age limit but only 5% of women born in
1973 did so. These are results from modern Europe. Casual evidence suggests that such
culturally influenced age limits are far stronger in traditional South Asian ones than in
modern European ones. Unfortunately we are not aware of similar survey evidence from
Asia but even in the 1960s survey data from the USA, Neugarten, Moore, and Lowe (1965)
reported that 80% of male and 90% of female respondents believed that men should marry
between the ages of 20-25 and 85% of male and 90% of women set the analogous age range
for women between 19-24.
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tion (from hereon we drop the agent i subscripts, unless needed for clarity):
t
[
∂V s
∂e
−
∂V m
∂e
]
+
∂V m
∂e
= 0,
while that for t is
V s − V m − 2δ(t− t∗) = 0.
Let
Λ =
∂V s
∂e
−
∂V m
∂e
.
For the first order condition for e to hold, it must be the case that ∂V m/∂e <
0 and that ∂V s/∂e > 0. Thus the optimal level of e lies between e¯m and e¯s.
Note that at the optimal choice of e, Λ > 0.
To study the mutual dependence of e and t, totally differentiate the
first-order condition for e:
∂e
∂t
∣∣∣∣
t
= −
Λ
Γ
> 0,
where
Γ = t
∂2V s
∂e2
+ (1− t)
∂2V m
∂e2
< 0.
Since Λ > 0 at the point of optimality, e will increase with t.
Turning to the choice of t, it can be solved explicitly from the first-order
condition.
t = t∗ +
V s − V m
2δ
,
which implies that
V s
>
=
<
V m =⇒ t
>
=
<
t∗.
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In other words, a female delays getting married if her utility from remaining
single exceeds utility from being married and expedites marriage otherwise.
By totally differentiating the first-order condition for t,
∂t
∂e
∣∣∣∣
e
=
Λ
2δ
> 0.
Thus t depends positively on e.9
3 Data
This paper employs data from the 2003 National Living Standard Survey of
Nepal, carried out by its Central Bureau of Statistics with the technical sup-
port of the World Bank and UK Department of International Development.
The survey follows the World Bank’s Living Standard Measurement Survey
Strategy and applies a two-step stratified sampling scheme. It took place
over 269 Primary Sampling Units, covering 73 out of a total of 75 districts
in Nepal and comprises information related to demography, education and
literacy, health and maternity, and other information at the household and
individual levels. A total of 5240 households and 28110 individuals were
included in the sample, and 5028 married females. The data cover the five
9The above analysis is based on separation of decision making: the educational level
is determined taking age at marriage as given; while age at marriage is determined tak-
ing education as given. Theoretically an alternative formulation could be to have the
educational decision made prior to the age-at-marriage one and taking into account the
dependence of the latter on the former. This alternative is unlikely to affect the quali-
tative predictions of the model and besides it makes more sense in the context of most
South Asian countries to assume a separation of authority between mothers, who might
exert greater influence on marital decisions and fathers, who might control the allocation
of household resources over children’s education.
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administrative regions of Nepal: Eastern, Central, Western, Mid-Western
and Far-Western, and an additional category of Abroad for those who were
not residing in Nepal at the time of the survey (mostly in India).
The inclusion of all married females to estimate the effect of age at mar-
riage on education may lead to the sample selection bias since unmarried
females will be systematically excluded. Table 2 reports females’ marital
status for different age groups. The table shows that the likelihood of mar-
riage increases monotonically until 30 years old at which less than 2.5%
will remain unmarried. We thus consider two sub-samples, Sample2549 and
Sample3049, for the age range of 25-49 and 30-49 years old, in order to con-
sider a sample where potential selection bias because of marriage is minor.
Our sub-samples thus contain married, divorced, separated and widows in
those age ranges. The upper limit of 49 is arbitrarily imposed to exclude
potential selection bias because of mortality. It should be noted that the
former sub-sample is considerably larger than the latter, and this may have
a significant impact on the statistical significance of the regression models.
The survey contains two types of educational information on individuals:
(1) the highest level of completed schooling, and (2) a categorical question
about whether the individual (i) never attended school, (ii) attended in the
past and (iii) is currently attending school. Only 28% (from the Sample2549
sub-sample) answered question (1). For those respondents who did not an-
swer question (1) but answered question (2-i), we imputed their educational
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level as zero. This increased the sample size considerably from 1079 to 3670
for Sample2549 and from 684 to 2818 for Sample3049. We define the mea-
sure of educational achievement derived from question (1) as Educ1, and
the measure derived by adding to Educ1 the imputed values for those who
answered question (2-i), as Educ2.
The variables used in the econometric analysis are presented in Table 3
(See the Appendix for the complete list of variables and their definitions).
The average school attainment for married women was 7.51 years using
Educ1 and fell dramatically to 2.16 years when Educ2 is used. Geographi-
cally the distribution of married women was 22%, 34%, 25%, 7% , 4% and
8% from the Eastern, Central, Western, Mid-western, Far-western regions
and Abroad, respectively, and 80% live in rural areas. They belong to fifteen
different ethnicities.
The upper part of Table 4 shows the distribution of marriage age across
the sample: 45% were married at or before the age of 16 years. Another 39%
were married between 17 and 20. Only 2% of the sample got married after
the age of 27 years. There is also a considerably lower age at marriage within
the Maithili community as compared to the non-Maithili communities. The
lower part of Table 4 presents details of the educational background of mar-
ried females. The majority of married women, 71%, do not appear to have
any formal schooling. Of the remainder, only 10% attained primary school,
4% secondary school, 7% high school and 8% received higher education.
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4 Econometric model and instrumental variables
Establishing a causal relationship between female age at marriage and female
schooling is not straightforward because of potential endogeneity. In the
context of traditional South Asian cultures, there are two potential sources
of endogeneity, both arising from the fact that both schooling and marital
decisions are effectively in the hands of the girls’ parents.
The first is the girl’s own ability to benefit from education. Parents in-
vest in a daughter’s education according to her expected future labor market
earnings, which in turn depends on labor market conditions for female em-
ployment and her individual ability to acquire and use human capital. As
our theoretical model suggests, if a girl’s parent judge her to be of relatively
low ability, they may decide both not to school her much, to make better
use of her time, and to marry her at an early age compared to other girls
within her community.
The second is the possibility that in traditional South Asian societies,
parents are heavily influenced by social norms that favor early marriage and
disfavor schooling of females. Thus social norms could induce a positive
relationship between the two variables.
For both reasons, there is a possibility of bi-directional causality be-
tween these two variables. Longitudinal data that span enough years could
account for such anticipation effects, but are unfortunately not available; we
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only observe ex-post decisions regarding education and the age at marriage.
Given these limitations, OLS estimates of the effects of age at marriage on
education are likely to be biased and to be unreliable for this reason.
We address these issues using instrumental variables (IVs) to predict a
female’s age at marriage on the basis of her own, her household’s and her
community’s characteristics. Our hypothesis, as reflected in the theoretical
model, is that those social norms of the ethnic community to which a female
belongs that are important in influencing her marital outcome do not directly
influence her education. This does not preclude community-level norms that
also directly affect education, such as a particular community’s bias against
female education which are controlled for by ethnicity dummies. Indeed,
there is evidence from attitudinal surveys that even in communities which
have very low rates of female education, all else equal, parents would like to
have their daughters receive at least high school-level education.(Keiko and
Yoshinori, 2006)
We use two IVs. The first, taken from ethnographic studies, is the in-
fluence of the dowry culture. As stated in the Introduction, the practice of
dowry is not only stricter in the Maithili community than in other Nepalese
communities, the Maithili custom of linking the value of the dowry to the
grooms’ economic status encourages parents to marry their daughters young.
Thus membership of the Maithili community is used as a dummy variable
in the age at marriage regression with the expected sign being negative.
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Note that the survey does not contain information about the dowry paid by
the females’ parents in the past. Looking at expenses in the current year,
Table 6 shows that Maithili households report higher dowry and wedding ex-
penses (the latter together with other ceremonies) as a proportion of wealth
(proxied by land holding) and income.
However, in using a single community, this instrument could suffer from
the potential bias that Maithilis both marry their daughters young and
have especially strong unobservable biases against educating their daugh-
ters. There is also the possibility of an income effect from large dowries,
as argued by Dhital (2012), whereby faced with the choice of paying for
their daughters’ education or saving up for their dowry, parent choose the
latter. By contrast, Dalmia and Lawrence (2005) argue that dowry size is a
function of differences in individual and household characteristics between
grooms and brides. This suggests that the lower the gap in such characteris-
tics, the smaller will be the dowry payment. This would actually encourage
investment in daughters’ education. These possibilities have received some
attention in the literature and from the limited number of empirical studies
on it, the results are mixed.
Dalmia and Lawrence (2005) employ household survey data from the
Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Karnataka, and find that, contrary to
their own argument, brides’ human capital was positively correlated with the
amount of dowry. The authors themselves pointed to two types of possible
17
confounding biases in their data. First, in a polygamous marriage market, a
relatively large number of women might have been competing for a limited
number of eligible men, and both the educational level of women and the
dowry might have reflected this asymmetry between men and women. Sec-
ond, both variables might have been positively correlated with household
wealth.
Another study carried out by Anderson (2004) estimated the effects of
brides’ education on dowry payments (parental characteristics and distance
to school were used as IVs in the education regression). Employing data
from Pakistan this study found a positive relationship between the brides’
education and dowry size. However, when the average level of education
was controlled for, the estimated coefficient on bride’s education became
statistically insignificant. These studies make it appear that dowry size
might not directly discourage female schooling. Nonetheless in light of this
and the possibility of a Maithili-specific bias, we employ a second IV.
The second instrument is the average age of marriage for the respondent’s
reference group. We define this group as the intersection of the ethnic and re-
gional community to which she belongs. Our assumption is that the average
age of marriage of females in the reference group proxies for the culturally
derived ideal age of marriage to which the respondent is expected to aspire.
To the extent that there is regional variation in this variable within the same
ethnic group, we hypothesise that this reflects peer-group effects on expected
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age at marriage but that the innate cultural attitudes towards female educa-
tion, which might be present within her ethnic group as a whole, have been
washed out by this variation. We are assuming that there is no systematic
correlation between a particular ethno-regional community’s (unobservable)
cultural norms towards an appropriate age of female marriage and an ap-
propriate level of girls’ schooling, apart from how the former might influence
the latter. Note also that, unlike cultural norms regarding age-at-marraige.
we are not aware of any literature which suggests the existence of cultural
norms regarding an appropriate level of female schooling, even in cultures
that might be generally biased against it.
A strong point for the exogoneity of both IVs in our model is the inclusion
of mother’s education as an additional covariate which captures any plausible
community specific bias on female education. In other words, if a particular
community has negative attitudes toward their daughters’ education this
effect should have already been reflected in their mothers’ education. This
is especially true in the South Asian region where marriage predominantly
happens within communities. Our results show that the coefficients for
mother education is significant only in second stage, but not in first stage,
which implies that it is specifically capturing the effect of mother’s education
on daughter’s education. The validity of the Maithili community and average
age of marriage IVs should thus be considered as conditional on mother’s
education.
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We use three different IVs models. The three different models use as in-
struments: (1) IV1: a Maithili-community binary variable, (2) IV2: average
age of females within the ethnic-regional grouping to which the respondent
belongs, and (3) Two IVs: both. In the first-stage of each regression, age at
marriage is regressed on the appropriate IV(s) (and other control variables),
and in the second-stage, educational attainment as measured by Educ1 and
Educ2 is regressed on the predicted age at marriage and other control vari-
ables.
The two stage regression model can be expressed as,
Educi = β0 + β1Magei + β2Xi + ui, (1)
Magei = δ0 + δ1Zi + δ2Xi + vi, (2)
where Educ is years of schooling and Mage is age at marriage associated
with female i. X comprises a set of exogenous covariates, representing indi-
vidual as well as household characteristics such as age, age square, father’s
education, household wealth proxied by the value of landholding, household
size, number of siblings, ethnic dummies as well as regional dummies. See
the Appendix for the complete list of variables and their definition. Z is
the IV set (IV1, IV2 or Two IVs). u and v are the idiosyncratic error terms
associated with female i.
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5 Results
5.1 Baseline model
Tables 7 and 9 present the first-stage and Tables 8 and 10 second-stage base-
line regressions, for each sub-sample, respectively. White robust standard
errors are reported. Regional and ethnicity dummy variables are included
but coefficients not reported. Education is measured, as explained in Sec-
tion 3, by both Educ1 and Educ2. In the discussions below, the results
following from each of these two different measures are analogously identi-
fied as the Educ1 and Educ2 samples, respectively. In order to save space,
coefficients are not reported for all the explanatory variables that were used
in the regressions, but they are available upon request.
We next consider the three IV models, again for both the Educ1 and
Educ2 samples. IV1 uses only the Maithili dummy as an instrument; IV2
uses only the average age at marriage by ethnicity and region; and Two IVs
uses both instruments together. As expected in IV1, due to the presumed
effect of a strong dowry culture, membership to the Maithili community has
a significant and negative relationship with age at marriage. The estimated
coefficient for the Educ1 sample is -1.7 for the sample of 25-49 years old,
and -1.6 for the sample of 30-49 years old. A coefficient of -.89 and -1.13
correspond to the Educ2 sample, for 25-49 and 30-49 years old, respectively.
The first-stage IV2 model shows positive and statistically significant co-
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efficients of Avmage. When both IVs are used together the Maithili coef-
ficients are slightly reduced but they maintain they statistical significance.
The calculated F-statistics (reported in Tables 8 and 10) are no less than 11
for the largest 25-49 years old sample indicating strong joint significance of
the estimated coefficients, but the same statistic is smaller when the smaller
sub-sample of 30-49 years old is used. When both IVs are used, the Sar-
gan over-identifying restriction test p-values (reported in Tables 8 and 10)
cannot reject the null hypothesis of validity of the IVs.
Regarding the other explanatory variables, a quick overview shows that
the results in the first-stage regression are more or less as expected. Father’s
education, landholding, household income and living in urban areas increase
age at marriage. Mother’s education is not statistically significant in any
first-stage specification.
Turning to the second-stage results, the first column in Tables 8 and 10
shows the OLS coefficients. They imply that increasing age at marriage by 1
year is likely to increase female’s educational level by .315 years using Educ1
and .193 years using Educ2 for the sample of 25-49 years-old and .269 years
using Educ1 and .159 years using Educ2 for the sample of 30-49 years-old.
Each of the IVs models shows a positive impact of delaying age at mar-
riage (Mage) on education although the level of significance varies across
models and samples. For the 25-49 years old sample, Educ1 IV1 model
shows a coefficient of age at marriage on education of .335 (not significant),
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IV2 .456, and Two IVs model .411 (significant at the 5% level). For Educ2,
Mage also has a positive (statistically significant at 1% level) effect in all
models: .564, .324 and .561 for IV1, IV2 and Two IV models, respectively.
For the 30-49 years old sample, Educ1 model, the coefficients of Mage are
not statistically significant. However, for Educ2, Mage has a positive effect
in all models: .346 (at 5%), .175 (at 10%) and .212 (at 5%) for IV1, IV2 and
Two IV models, respectively. These estimates are roughly in line with but
slightly higher than that found by Field and Ambrus (2008) for Bangladesh
where increasing age at marriage by one year increases education by 0.22
years.
In all second-stage specifications mother’s and father’s education are pos-
itive and statistically significant. Moreover, as expected, there are significant
differences between urban and rural areas.
Overall, the IV models show similar effect of marriage age on education
than the OLS models. The standard errors also increase considerably, which
determine less precise estimates and thus greater variance in significance
levels.
5.2 Robustness and validity of the estimated results
In this section, we consider potential sources of bias in our estimates and
outline our attempts to address them. We present results for the sub-sample
of 25-49 years old females only.
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First, there is the possibility that poverty drives parents both to keep
their daughters out of school and to marry them young so that the burden
of maintenance falls on their husbands and in-laws. Moreover, poor parents
could be more susceptible to trading off girls’ education for the sake of
accumulating a sufficient dowry, even in communities that do not practice
dowry culture as strictly as Maithilis do.
Second, a potential detrimental effect of early marriage on female edu-
cation may arise because, unlike our theoretical model in which marriage
happens only after the age of schooling has passed, a significant proportion
of Nepalese girls get married during childhood and could therefore be obliged
to abandon schooling and take up household duties. Both of these sources
of bias could affect both our IVs.
A third possible source of bias, affecting only the Maithili instrument,
is that this might reflect regional variations in marriage practice, especially
regarding age at marriage, rather than an effect of dowry culture specific
to Maithilis. This possibility arises because Maithilis are concentrated in
certain regions of Nepal that border India; to be precise in four of the six
regions of our survey data: Eastern, Central, Western and Abroad. Since
cultural practices in Nepal do vary by region and the concomitant degree of
urbanization, this could arise as a source of bias.
We start first by looking at the possibility that poverty underlies the
observed relationship between female education and age at marriage. We
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address this by running our regressions on a restricted sub-sample of house-
holds that belong to the upper half of the wealth distribution (proxied by
land holding). The results appear in Tables 11 and 12. We shall discuss
separately the cases of Educ1 and Educ2. For Educ1, the first-stage coeffi-
cients of the instruments increased in value and remain significant at the 1%
level across all IV models. In the second-stage regression the coefficient of
age at marriage increased for IV1 and dropped in value and/or significance
for IV2 and Two Ivs models. For Educ2, a marginal decrease is observed
in the second-stage regression in the three IV models. The p-value of the
Sargan tests and the F-statistics confirm the validity of the instruments in
this sub-sample. The important point is that by and large our qualitative
results continue to hold at similar levels of significance, especially in the
larger sample.
Second, we look at the possibility that the detrimental effect of early
marriage on female education arises because of child marriages. To filter
out this effect, we run regressions on the sub-sample of females who married
above the age of 15. The reasons for these cutoff ages are, respectively, 15
is the age set by the International Labor Organization (ILO) convention as
the minimum age of employment and one reason for this is that it is the
age by which most children will have completed secondary school, while 16
is age at which childhood ends according to Nepal’s Children Act, 1992.
If child marriage is the main driving force behind low female education we
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would expect insignificant effects of age at marriage on education in these
sub-samples. The results for the first sub-sample appear in Tables 13 and
14. Overall the results are similar in magnitide and significance to the
corresponding baseline regression models, showing a positive effect of age of
marriage on education. The Sargan test rejects the exogeneity of IVs in the
Educ2 case.
The third potential source of bias is that the Maithili instrument might
reflect regional variations in marriage practice rather than the effect of
Maithili dowry culture. Maithilis are concentrated in regions of Nepal that
border India and we know that cultural practices in Nepal vary by region
and the concomitant degree of urbanization. We addressed this possibil-
ity by estimating our models on a sub-sample that comes from regions in
which the Maithali community are concentrated. This sub-sample includes
the Eastern, Central, Western and Abroad regions but excludes the Mid-
Western and Far Western regions. The results appear in Tables 15 and 16.
The estimates reported in Table 16 are similar to the corresponding baseline
models.
6 Conclusions
We investigated the impact of planned age at marriage on female education
on the basis of a theoretical framework for jointly determining both vari-
ables which we then tested using household data from Nepal. In light of the
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framework, we developed instruments that could control for the potential
endogeneity of our main explanatory variable and then employed an instru-
mental variables procedure for identifying its impact on female education.
Our results suggest that a strict adherence to dowry practices, as in
the Maithili community, lowers age at marriage while the average age of
marriage of one’s ethno-regional group increases it. We then found that
marital behaviours that favour early marriage significantly reduce female
educational attainment. While the results differed across our different in-
strumental variables and samples, the estimates indicate that each year’s
delay in marriage increases female education from 0.2 to 0.5 years. This
figure is roughly in line with but slightly higher than that found by Field
and Ambrus (2008) for Bangladesh.
We also tested all our models on sub-samples of the data in order to
control for potential bias. These were the possibilities that (i) the positive
association of female education with age at marriage could reflect the re-
sults of a coping mechanism amongst the poorest households; (ii) the high
incidence of child marriage in Nepal could have induced our estimated co-
efficients through a more direct ex post mechanism rather than the more
indirect ex ante mechanism stressed by the theory; (iii) the concentration of
Maithilis in certain regions of Nepal could have led to results which reflect
regional variations rather than the dowry culture of Maithilis. Overall our
robustness results continue to suggest a negative impact of early marriage
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on female education.
The implied causality effects has important policy implications. Policies
that increase marriage age might increase parent’s incentives to spend on
girls’ education.
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Appendix: Variables definition.
Educ1 Years of schooling (highest level completed).
Educ2 Years of schooling imputed as 0 for those who did not report highest level completed but
reported as they never attended school.
Age:25-29 Taking value 1 if an individual’s age was reported between 25-29 years; 0 otherwise.
Age:30-34 Taking value 1 if an individual’s age was reported between 30-34 years; 0 otherwise.
Age:35-39 Taking value 1 if an individual’s age was reported between 35-39 years; 0 otherwise.
Age:40-44 Taking value 1 if an individual’s age was reported between 40-44 years; 0 otherwise.
Age:45-49 Taking value 1 if an individual’s age was reported between 45-49 years; 0 otherwise.
Urban Taking value 1 if respondent was born in urban area; 0 otherwise.
Mage Age at marriage.
Feduc Father’s the highest level of education.
Meduc Mother’s the highest level of education.
Lnholding Price of land holdings by a household.
Hincome Household gross income calculated as farm-earning plus earning from sale of livestocks plus
income from non-farm enterprises plus remittance received .
Maithili Taking value 1 if an individual’s language was reported as Maithili; 0 otherwise.
Avmage Average age at marriage derived from the interaction term between ethnicity and region.
Brahman Taking value 1 if a respondent’s ethnicity was reported as Brahman; 0 otherwise.
Chhetri Taking value 1 if a respondent’s ethnicity was reported as Chhetri; 0 otherwise.
Newar Taking value 1 if a respondent’s ethnicity was reported as Newar; 0 otherwise.
Magar Taking value 1 if a respondent’s ethnicity was reported as Magar; 0 otherwise.
Tharu Taking value 1 if a respondent’s ethnicity was reported as Tharu; 0 otherwise.
Tamang Taking value 1 if a respondent’s ethnicity was reported as Tamang; 0 otherwise.
Kami Taking value 1 if a respondent’s ethnicity was reported as Kami; 0 otherwise.
Yadav Taking value 1 if a respondent’s ethnicity was reported as Yadav; 0 otherwise.
Muslim Taking value 1 if a respondent’s ethnicity was reported as Muslim; 0 otherwise.
Rai Taking value 1 if a respondent’s ethnicity was reported as Rai; 0 otherwise.
Gurung Taking value 1 if a respondent’s ethnicity was reported as Gurung; 0 otherwise.
Limbu Taking value 1 if a respondent’s ethnicity was reported as Limbu; 0 otherwise.
Sarki Taking value 1 if a respondent’s ethnicity was reported as Sarki; 0 otherwise.
Other Taking value 1 if a respondent’s ethnicity was reported as Other; 0 otherwise.
Eastern Taking value 1 if an individual was residing in eastern development region; 0 otherwise.
Central Taking value 1 if an individual was residing in central development region; 0 otherwise.
Western Taking value 1 if an individual was residing in western development region; 0 otherwise.
Mid-western Taking value 1 if an individual was residing in mid-western development region; 0 otherwise.
Far-western Taking value 1 if an individual was residing in far-western development region; 0 otherwise.
Abroad Taking value 1 if an individual was residing in abroad; 0 otherwise.
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Table 1: Gender Parity Index (GPI) on educational enrollment in South
Asia: 2002
Country/region Pre-primary Primary Secondary Upper secondary
World .99 .93 .93 .92
SAARC .98 .86 .82 .76
Bangladesh 1 - 1.21 .93
Bhutan - .92 92 .74
India 1.03 .87 .78.69 -
Maldives .99 .96 1.17 .88
Nepal .85 .86 .78 .68
Pakistan - .68 - -
Sri Lanka - .99** 1.01** 1.14
Source: Institute for statistics, UNESCO.
Notes: - Indicates data not available and ** indicates GPI based on previous
year.
Table 2: Females’ marital status by age group (in %)
Age group Married Divorced Separated Widow Unmarried
<= 15 2.76 0.10 - 0.05 97.09
16-20 42.98 0.19 0.51 0.13 56.20
21-24 76.08 0.10 0.52 0.21 23.09
25-29 90.76 - 0.84 0.65 7.74
30-34 93.74 - 1.76 2.09 2.41
35-39 93.35 0.18 0.72 3.60 2.16
40-44 89.49 0.26 2.37 5.78 2.10
45-49 83.22 0.34 2.37 12.37 1.69
Total∗ 59.51 0.14 1.15 8.91 30.29
Notes: ∗ all ages, including age> 49.
35
Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Variable Sample2549 Sample3049
Educ1 7.51(.106) 7.37(.136)
Educ2 2.16(.063) 1.78(.068)
Feduc 2.75(.138) 2.75(.175)
Meduc .649(.070) .611(.087)
Urban .202(.012) .219(.015)
Lnholding(’00000) 3.008(.469) 3.11(.536)
Hincome(’00000) 177.54(41.98) 141.93(38.88)
Mage 19.00(.107) 18.97(.144)
Age dummies
25-29 .366(.014) -
30-34 .217(.012) .342(.018)
35-49 .220(.012) .346(.018)
40-44 .108(.008) .178(.014)
45-49 .084(.008) .133(.012)
Ethnic dummies
Brahman .255(.013) .271(.017)
Chettri .155(.011) .160(.014)
Newar .253(.013) .276(.017)
Magar .046(.006) .042(.007)
Tharu .022(.004) .017(.005)
Tamang .021(.004) .014(.004)
Kami .012(.003) .010(.003)
Yadav .010(.003) .005(.002)
Muslim .012(.003) .010(.003)
Rai .024(.004) .016(.004)
Gurung .032(.005) .035(.007)
Damai .010(.003) .004(.002)
Limbu .012(.003) .010(.003)
Sarki .001(.001) -
Others .142(.010) .124(.012)
Regional dummies
Eastern .216(.012) .192(.015)
Central .335(.014) .365(.018)
Western .253(.013) .248(.016)
Mid-western .072(.007) .077(.010)
Far-western .033(.005) .030(.006)
Abroad .076(.008) .071(.009)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 4: Comparison of age at marriage and educational distribution
Sample2549 Sample3049
Variable All Non-Maithili Maithili All Non-Maithili Maithili
Age at marriage
Average 17.44(.059) 17.71(.064) 15.78(.127) 17.34(.078) 17.61(.077) 15.48(.157)
Married ≤16 .45(.008) .42(.008) .65(.021) .47(.009) .44(.009) .69(.024)
Married 17-18 .25(.007) .25(.007) .22(.018) .24(.008) .25(.008) .20(.021)
Married 19-20 .14(.005) .15(.006) .09(.012) .14(.006) .15(.007) .08(.014)
Married 21-22 .07(.004) .08(.004) .02(.006) .07(.004) .07(.005) .02(.006)
Married 23-24 .04(.003) .04(.003) .01(.0050 .03(.003) .03(.003) .005(.002)
Married 25-26 .03(.002) .03(.003) .005(.002) .03(.003) .03(.003) .005(.002)
Married ≥27 .02(.002) .02(.002) .005(.002) .02(.002) .03(.003) .005(.002)
Education
No formal schooling .71(.007) .69(.008) .87(.014) .76(.008) .73(.008) .92(.014)
Primary [1-5] .10(.004) .11(.005) .06(.010) .09(.005) .10(.005) .04(.009)
Secondary [6-7] .04(.003) .03(.003) .03(.007) .03(.003) .03(.003) .01(.006)
High school [8-10] .07(.004) .08(.004) .02(.006) .06(.004) .07(.005) .01(.005)
Higher education [≥11] .08(.004) .09(.004) .02(.006) .06(.004) .07(.007) .02(.007)
Obs. 3760 3244 516 2818 2460 358
Notes: Grades corresponding to each educational level from variable Educ2 are presented in
brackets. Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 5: Distribution of the Maithili community
Ethnicity Sample2549 Sample3049
Ethnic distribution
Bramhin .02(.005) .02(.007)
Yadav .16(.016) .17(.019)
Muslim .14(.014) .13(.017)
Sarki .03(.007) .02(.007)
Tharu .04(.008) .03(.009)
Other .61(.018) .63(.025)
Regional distribution
Eastern .38(.021) .38(.025)
Central .36(.021) .36(.025)
Western .01(.003) .01(.004)
Mid-western - -
Far-western - -
Abroad(India) .25(.018) .25(.015)
Obs. 516 358
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 6: Wedding expenses: Current year (in ’000)
Maithili Non-Maithili
Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urban
D-cost 19.39(38.13) 20.84(39.92) 7.04(11.86) 5.66(26.70) 5.55(28.7) 5.99(21.90)
Obs. 57 48 9 764 582 182
Wed-exp 7.62(20.96) 7.75(21.41) 5.38(11.10) 8.41(32.37) 6.43(16.15) 19.31(72.50)
Obs. 232 220 12 1776 1503 273
D-cost/Lnholding .219 .251 0.060 .020 .029 .015
D-cost/Hincome .005 .015 .0004 .0005 .0005 .0005
Wed-exp/Lnholding .088 .092 .041 .044 .040 .054
Wed-exp/Hincome .004 .004 .003 .001 .001 .0007
Note: D-cost=dowry paid, Wed-exp= marriage, birth and other ceremonies expenses. These
figures represent aggregate household data. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 7: First-stage regression results: Baseline model (Sample2549)
Variable IV1 IV2 Two IVs
Dep.var. Mage, sub-sample for Educ1
Avmage - .737***(.167) .705***(.167)
Maithili -1.70***(.503) - -1.58***(.500)
Age:30-34 -.169(.272) -.083(.270) -.164(.270)
Age:35-39 -.295(.269) -.259(.268) -.305(.267)
Age:40-44 -.135(.341) -.115(.339) -.145(.338)
Age:45-49 -.722*(.381) -.683*(.379) -.747*(.378)
Feduc .094***(.025) .090***(.025) .094***(.025)
Meduc -.046(.049) -.034(.049) -.039(.049)
Urban 1.22***(.311) 1.09***(.312) 1.05***(.311)
Lnholding 1.33*(.792) 1.28*(.788) 1.26*(.783)
Hincome .011(.009) .011(.009) .011(.009)
Obs. 1079 1079 1079
R2 .1644 .1704 .1775
Dep.var. Mage, sub-sample for Educ2
Avmage - .997***(.099) .976***(.099)
Maithili -.890***(.200) - -.790***(.198)
Age:30-34 -.083(.165) -.108(.163) -.127(.163)
Age:35-39 -.235*(.154) -.253*(.152) -.278*(.152)
Age:40-44 -.439***(.165) -.446***(.163) -.478***(.163)
Age:45-49 -.818**(.182) -.847***(.180) -.861***(.180)
Feduc .115***(.021) .114***(.020) .115***(.020)
Meduc -.006(.046) .002(.045) -.003(.045)
Urban 1.64***(.238) 1.44***(.237) 1.42***(.236)
Lnholding 1.33**(.673) 1.26*(.669) 1.24*(.665)
Hincome .014(.011) .013(.011) .013(.010)
Obs. 3760 3760 3760
R2 .1921 .2031 .2063
Notes: Sample of 25-49 years old. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** significant at 1%, ** significant 5%, * significant at 10% level. Mage
is treated as endogenous. IV1: Maithili. IV2: Avmage. Age:25-49 as base
category. Regional and ethnicity dummies are included but not reported.
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Table 8: Second-stage regression results: Baseline model (Sample2549)
Variable OLS IV1 IV2 Two IVs
Dep.var. Educ1
Mage .315***(.028) .335(.254) .456**(.199) .411**(.161)
Age:30-34 -.348*(.236) -.347*(.235) -.337(.237) -.340(.236)
Age:35-39 -.437*(.233) -.432*(.240) -.402*(.240) -.413*(.236)
Age:40-44 -.551*(.297) -.549*(.295) -.537*(.298) -.541*(.296)
Age:45-49 -1.19***(.372) -1.18***(.368) -1.10***(.357) -1.13***(.346)
Feduc .184***(.020) .183***(.031) .172***(.028) .176***(.026)
Meduc .091***(.031) .092**(.044) .097**(.044) .095**(.043)
Urban 1.86***(.279) 1.83***(.419) 1.68***(.371) 1.73***(.338)
Lnholding -.534(.679) -.563(.729) -.730(.647) -.668(.641)
Hincome .001(.003) .001(.003) .001(.003) .001(.003)
IVs F-statistic [11.52] [19.30] [14.72]
Sargan test p-value {.7023}
R2 .3625 .3621 .3458 .3546
Dep.var. Educ2
Mage .193***(.017) .564***(.213) .324***(.088) .361***(.083)
Age:30-34 -.649***(.156) -.627***(.157) -.641***(.146) -.639***(.147)
Age:35-39 -1.14***(.141) -1.07***(.152) -1.12***(.137) -1.11***(.137)
Age:40-44 -1.61***(.145) -1.46***(.179) -1.56***(.150) -1.54***(.151)
Age:45-49 -1.64***(.156) -1.34***(.243) -1.54***(.176) -1.51***(.175)
Feduc .385***(.023) .343***(.031) .371***(.021) .366***(.020)
Meduc .211***(.041) .211***(.043) .211***(.040) .211***(.040)
Urban 2.64***(.291) 2.02***(.424) 2.42***(.258) 2.36***(.254)
Lnholding 1.06(.807) .560(.713) .886(.758) .836(.742)
Hincome .010(.010) .005(.007) .008(.009) .008(.009)
IVs F-statistic [19.76] [101.17] [26.43]
Sargan test p-value {.1419}
R2 .4314 .2105 .2224 .4282
Notes: Sample of 25-49 years old. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** significant at 1%, ** significant 5%, * significant at 10% level. Mage
is treated as endogenous. IV1: Maithili. IV2: Avmage. Age:25-49 as base
category. Regional and ethnicity dummies are included but not reported.
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Table 9: First-stage regression results: Baseline model (Sample3049)
Variable IV1 IV2 Two IVs
Dep.var. Mage, sub-sample for Educ1
Avmage - .822***(.203) .785***(.207)
Maithili -1.60*(.803) - -1.30*(.794)
Age:35-39 -.151(.327) -.191(.322) -.162(.323)
Age:40-44 .021(.396) -.048(.392) .001(.397)
Age:45-49 -.545(.424) -.583(.411) -.567(.415)
Feduc .108***(.031) .106***(.031) .108***(.031)
Meduc -.063(.065) -.045(.064) -.048(.064)
Urban 1.51***(.447) 1.39***(.445) 1.37***(.450)
Lnholding .720(1.01) .672(.999) .651(.995)
Hincome .029***(.003) .028***(.003) .027***(.003)
Obs. 684 684 684
R2 .1650 .2113 .2148
Dep.var. Mage, sub-sample for Educ2
Avmage - 1.00***(.111) .974***(.111)
Maithili -1.13***(.221) - -1.01***(.219)
Age:35-39 -.145(.162) -.136(.161) -.144(.160)
Age:40-44 -.370**(.183) -.345*(.181) -.362**(.180)
Age:45-49 -.750***(.209) -.751***(.207) -.746***(.206)
Feduc .112***(.026) .113***(.026) .113***(.026)
Meduc -.024(.060) -.011(.059) -.017(.060)
Urban 1.96***(.352) 1.78***(.356) 1.75***(.356)
Lnholding .719(.789) .649(.785) .623(.774)
Hincome .036***(.003) .035***(.004) .035***(.003)
Obs. 2818 2818 2818
R2 .1956 .2104 .2071
Notes: Sample of 30-49 years old. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** significant at 1%, ** significant 5%, * significant at 10% level. IV1:
Maithili. IV2: Avmage. Age:30-34 as base category. Regional and ethnicity
dummies are included but not reported.
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Table 10: Second-stage regression results: Baseline model (Sample3049)
Variable OLS IV1 IV2 Two IVs
Dep.var. Educ1
Mage .269***(.034) -.054(.446) .169(.169) .125(.161)
Age:35-39 -.140(.268) -.200(.294) -.158(.268) -.167(.269)
Age:40-44 -.264(.324) -.277(.343) -.268(.320) -.270(.323)
Age:45-49 -.990**(.392) -1.17**(.482) -1.04***(.401) -1.07***(.402)
Feduc .203***(.026) .238***(.056) .214***(.031) .219***(.031)
Meduc .106***(.040) .086*(.048) .100***(.039) .097***(.039)
Urban 1.81***(.371) 2.31***(.794) 1.97***(.443) 2.03***(.441)
Lnholding -1.24(.729) -1.01(1.01) -1.17*(.794) -1.14(.825)
Hincome .006(.005) .016(.013) .009(.007) .011*(.007)
IVs F-statistic [3.98] [16.38] [9.35]
Sargan test p-value {.6029}
R2 .2739 .3594
Dep.var. Educ2
Mage .159***(.018) .346**(.148) .175*(.098) .212**(.083)
Age:35-39 -.500***(.149) -.475***(.152) -.498***(.149) -.493***(.149)
Age:40-44 -.964***(.152) -.898***(.163) -.959***(.156) -.946***(.154)
Age:45-49 -1.00***(.162) .862***(.202) -.991***(.179) -.963***(.175)
Feduc .390***(.029) .369***(.033) .388***(.032) .384***(.031)
Meduc .233***(.053) .236***(.052) .233***(.052) .234***(.052)
Urban 2.64***(.353) 2.26***(.862) 2.60***(.392) 2.53***(.381)
Lnholding .936(1.27) .796(1.19) .924(1.26) .897(1.25)
Hincome .029*(.015) .023*(.015) .029*(.015) .028*(.015)
IVs F-statistic [26.30] [80.37] [51.70]
Sargan test p-value {.3055}
R2 .4256 .3939 .4253 .4230
Notes: Sample of 30-49 years old. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** significant at 1%, ** significant 5%, * significant at 10% level. Mage
is treated as endogenous. IV1: Maithili. IV2: Avmage. Age:30-34 as base
category. Regional and ethnicity dummies are included but not reported.
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Table 11: First-stage regression results: Upper wealth households
Variable IV1 IV2 Two IVs
Dep.var. Mage, sub-sample for Educ1
Avmage - .964***(.181) .940***(.184)
Maithili -2.08***(.581) - -1.79***(.586)
Age:30-34 -.223(.374) -.145(.364) -.218(.361)
Age:35-39 -.633*(.372) -.528(.367) -.598*(.365)
Age:40-44 -.544(.501) -.676(.496) -.633(.494)
Age:45-49 -.963*(.569) -1.13**(.536) -1.21**(.532)
Feduc .064(.039) .066*(.038) .074(.038)
Meduc .001(.084) -.006(.083) .000(.082)
Urban 1.58***(.578) 1.35***(.595) 1.31***(.593)
Lnholding 1.07(.806) 1.00(.795) .929(.787)
Hincome -.003(.003) -.003(.003) -.003(.003)
Obs. 530 530 530
R2 .2036 .2271 .2553
Dep.var. Mage, sub-sample for Educ2
Avmage - .960***(.117) .927***(.119)
Maithili -1.22***(.260) - -1.09***(.258)
Age:30-34 -.139(.212) -.177(.209) -.185(.208)
Age:35-39 -.618***(.192) -.654***(.189) -.682***(.189)
Age:40-44 -.671***(.239) -.706***(.236) -.727***(.202)
Age:45-49 -1.10***(.272) -1.14***(.268) -1.16***(.266)
Feduc .091***(.031) .097***(.030) .100***(.030)
Meduc .043(.074) .038(.073) .038(.072)
Urban 1.96***(.604) 1.77***(.013) 1.70***(.613)
Lnholding 1.45**(.738) 1.27*(.720) 1.26*(.713)
Hincome -.006(.005) -.006(.005) -.006(.005)
Obs. 1877 1877 1877
R2 .1975 .1997 .2052
Notes: Sample of 25-49 years old. Top 50% households in terms of land
holding. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, **
significant 5%, * significant at 10% level. Mage is treated as endogenous.
IV1: Maithili. IV2: Avmage. Age:25-49 as base category. Regional and
ethnicity dummies are included but not reported.
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Table 12: Second-stage regression results: Upper wealth households
Variable OLS IV1 IV2 Two IVs
Dep.var. Educ1
Mage .300***(.046) .500**(.246) .335**(.157) .364***(.140)
Age:30-34 -.428(.356) -.399(.358) -.435(.347) -.431(.347)
Age:35-39 -.576*(.339) -.465(.357) -.540*(.331) -.526*(.329)
Age:40-44 -1.03***(.432) -.916*(.473) -1.01**(.429) -.996**(.432)
Age:45-49 -2.02***(.496) -1.85***(.532) -2.08***(.492) -.198***(.492)
Feduc .174***(.035) .163***(.036) .175***(.035) .173***(.035)
Meduc .122***(.063) .124*(.067) .120*(.062) .120*(.063)
Urban 1.89***(.553) 1.55**(.699) 1.94***(.577) 1.89***(.569)
Lnholding -.260(.743) -.159(.850) -.316(.724) -.272(.739)
Hincome -.005*(.003) -.005*(.003) -.005*(.003) -.005*(.003)
IVs F-statistic - [12.90] [28.31] [17.31]
Sargan test p-value {.6935}
R2 .3622 .3315 .3647 .3628
Dep.var. Educ2
Mage .182***(.025) .384**(.185) .313***(.118) .330***(.103)
Age:30-34 -.926***(.238) -.900***(.239) -.910***(.236) -.907***(.236)
Age:35-39 -1.44***(.211) -1.32***(.235) -1.36***(.215) -1.35***(.213)
Age:40-44 -2.09***(.207) -.196***(.245) -2.01(.202) -2.00(.217)
Age:45-49 -2.09***(.216) -1.88(.298) -1.95***(.244) -1.93***(.238)
Feduc .371***(.037) .353***(.039) .359***(.038) .358***(.037)
Meduc .272***(.074) .263***(.074) .267***(.073) .266***(.074)
Urban 1.70***(.555) 1.28*(.705) 1.43**(.605) 1.39**(.602)
Lnholding 1.98*(1.02) 1.81*(1.00) 1.75*(.958) 1.76*(.958)
Hincome -.005(.007) -.004(.007) -.004(.006) -.004(.006)
IVs F-statistic [22.19] [66.38] [40.73]
Sargan test p-value {.7318}
R2 .3786 .3464 .3650 .3613
Notes: Sample of 25-49 years old. Top 50% households in terms of land
holding. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, **
significant 5%, * significant at 10% level. Mage is treated as endogenous.
IV1: Maithili. IV2: Avmage. Age:25-49 as base category. Regional and
ethnicity dummies are included but not reported.
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Table 13: First-stage regression results : Adult marriage (Mage ≥ 15)
Variable IV1 IV2 Two IVs
Dep.var. Mage, sub-sample for Educ1
Avmage - .720***(.171) .712***(.173)
Maithili -.895*(.522) - -.825*(.524)
Age:30-34 -.001(.259) .028(.255) -.006(.258)
Age:35-39 -.145(.269) -.145(.267) -.172(.264)
Age:40-44 -.235(.256) -.244(.356) -.267(.356)
Age:45-49 -.371(.393) -.376(.367) -.410(.372)
Feduc .078***(.023) .078***(.023) .079***(.023)
Meduc -.016(.045) -.006(.045) -.008(.045)
Urban 1.32***(.315) 1.18***(.318) 1.17***(.319)
Lnholding 1.10*(.743) 1.03(.734) 1.02(.732)
Hincome .009(.009) .008(.009) .008(.009)
Obs. 1003 1003 1003
R2 1˙293 .1442 .1456
Dep.var. Mage, sub-sample for Educ2
Avmage - .770***(.095) .751***(.096)
Maithili -.752***(.166) - -.656***(.165)
Age:30-34 .116(.144) .098(.141) .082(.141)
Age:35-39 -.057(.138) -.072(.138) -.092(.137)
Age:40-44 .038(.164) .039(.162) .009(.162)
Age:45-49 -.032(.200) -.069(.199) -.091(.198)
Feduc .085***(.020) .086***(.020) .086***(.019)
Meduc .014(.043) .022(.044) .017(.043)
Urban 1.56***(.269) 1.39***(.272) 1.38***(.271)
Lnholding 1.19*(.705) 1.10*(.699) 1.09*(.696)
Hincome .010(.011) .010(.010) .010(.010)
Obs. 3128 3128 3128
R2 .1512 .1725 .1672
Notes: Sample of 25-49 years old with age of marriage above or equal to 15
years old. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, **
significant 5%, * significant at 10% level. Mage is treated as endogenous.
IV1: Maithili. IV2: Avmage. Age:25-49 as base category. Regional and
ethnicity dummies are included but not reported.
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Table 14: Second-stage regression results: Adult marriage (Mage ≥ 15)
Variable OLS IV1 IV2 Two IVs
Dep.var. Educ1
Mage .294***(.031) .365(.486) .416*(.217) .410**(.199)
Age:30-34 -.459*(.245) -.462*(.243) -.464*(.243) -.464*(.343)
Age:35-39 -.498**(.242) -.490*(.245) -.484*(.243) -.485**(.242)
Age:40-44 -.632**(.307) -.617*(.320) -.606*(.313) -.607**(.312)
Age:45-49 -1.26***(.410) -1.24***(.436) -1.22***(.413) -1.22***(.411)
Feduc .187***(.021) .181***(.043) .178***(.026) .178***(.025)
Meduc .081**(.032) .082**(.033) .083**(.033) .083**(.033)
Urban 1.88***(2.88) 1.79**(.714) 1.72***(.404) 1.73***(.389)
Lnholding -.606(.603) -.687(.818) -.750(.624) -.742(.620)
Hincome .001(.003) .001(.005) .001(.003) .001(.002)
IVs F-statistic - [2.93] [17.61] [10.01]
Sargan test p-value {.9232}
R2 .3479 .3441 .3368 .3379
Dep.var. Educ2
Mage .198***(.023) 1.01***(.300) .366***(.129) .468***(.120)
Age:30-34 -.765***(.175) -.875***(.210) -.787***(.176) -.801***(.178)
Age:35-39 -1.27***(.158) -1.24***(.189) 1.26***(.158) -1.26***(.160)
Age:40-44 -1.76***(.168) -1.82***(.216) -1.77***(.170) -1.78***(.174)
Age:45-49 -1.81(.185) -1.80(.256) 1.81***(.190) -1.81***(.196)
Feduc .400(.025) .330***(.024) .385***(.027) .377(.026)
Meduc .190***(.046) .174***(.055) .187***(.045) .185***(.046)
Urban 2.71***(.310) 1.42**(.593) 2.44***(.367) 2.28***(.360)
Lnholding 1.12(.870) .139(.771) .922(.814) .798(.777)
Hincome .008(.010) .001(.006) .007(.008) .006(.008)
IVs F-statistic [20.45] [64.39] [38.99]
Sargan test p-value {.0193}
R2 .4465 .0997 .4318 .4086
Notes: Sample of 25-49 years old with age of marriage above or equal to 15
years old. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, **
significant 5%, * significant at 10% level. Mage is treated as endogenous.
IV1: Maithili. IV2: Avmage. Age:25-49 as base category. Regional and
ethnicity dummies are included but not reported.
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Table 15: First-stage regression results : Four regions
Variable IV1 IV2 Two IVs
Dep.var. Mage, sub-sample for Educ1
Avmage - .665***(.186) .660***(.185)
Maithili -1.55***(.518) - 1.53***(.515)
Age:30-34 -.065(.295) .024(.293) -.063(.294)
Age:35-39 -.281(.289) -.233(.289) -.272(.288)
Age:40-44 -.107(.359) -.060(.358) -.086(.356)
Age:45-49 -.708(.413) -.657*(.412) -.728(.411)
Feduc .093***(.027) .089***(.027) .094***(.026)
Meduc -.033(.051) -.019(.051) -.023(.051)
Urban 1.15***(.324) 1.05***(.325) 1.01***(.324)
Lnholding 1.23*(.660) 1.18*(.659) 1.14*(.657)
Hincome .011*(.007) .011*(.007) .010*(.007)
Obs. 960 960 960
R2 .1896 .1928 .2005
Dep.var. Mage, sub-sample for Educ2
Avmage - .921***(.127) .951***(.127)
Maithili -.747***(.211) - -.838***(.209)
Age:30-34 -.087(.188) -.077(.186) -.104(.186)
Age:35-39 -.327*(.176) -.318*(.174) -.344*(.174)
Age:40-44 -.467**(.188) -.452**(.187) -.489**(.187)
Age:45-49 -.916***(.206) -.912***(.205) -.927***(.204)
Feduc .118***(.022) .119***(.022) .120***(.022)
Meduc -.006(.048) .006(.048) .001(.047)
Urban 1.62***(.250) 1.45***(.250) 1.41***(.250)
Lnholding 1.28**(.649) 1.16**(.645) 1.14*(.644)
Hincome .013*(.007) .012*(.007) .012*(.007)
Obs. 3063 3063 3063
R2 .2067 .2170 .2211
Notes: Sample of 25-49 years old and Eastern, Central, Western and Abroad
only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, **
significant 5%, * significant at 10% level. Mage is treated as endogenous.
IV1: Maithili. IV2: Avmage. Age:25-49 as base category. Regional and
ethnicity dummies are included but not reported.
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Table 16: Second-stage regression results: Four regions
Variable OLS IV1 IV2 Two IVs
Dep.var. Educ1
Mage .316***(.030) .422*(.287) .503**(.245) .469**(.187)
Age:30-34 -.472*(.253) -.474*(.253) -.476*(.257) -.475*(.255)
Age:35-39 -.519**(.249) -.493*(.258) -.473*(.260) -.481*(.255)
Age:40-44 -.522*(.310) -.513(.310) -.507*(.314) -.510*(.312)
Age:45-49 -1.40***(.407) -1.34***(.400) -1.28***(.393) -1.31***(.378)
Feduc .194***(.021) .185***(.034) .178***(.032) 181***(.028)
Meduc .073**(.031) .076*(.045) .078*(.045) .077*(.045)
Urban 1.86***(.290) 1.73***(.443) 1.64***(.408) 1.68***(.360)
Lnholding -.639(.656) -.779(.678) -.876(.656) -.837(.621)
Hincome .001(.003) .001(.007) -.001(.007) -.001(.006)
IVs F-statistic - [9.00] [12.76] [10.90]
Sargan test p-value {.8301}
R2 .3674 .3578 .3377 .3474
Dep.var. Educ2
Mage .194***(.019) .575**(.272) .316**(.124) .370***(.109)
Age:30-34 -.845***(.178) -.820***(.181) -.837***(.168) -.833***(.169)
Age:35-39 -1.38***(.164) -1.27***(.188) -1.34***(.161) -1.33***(.162)
Age:40-44 -1.79***(.170) -1.62***(.216) -1.74***(.176) -1.71***(.176)
Age:45-49 -1.94***(.179) -1.60***(.316) -1.83***(.216) -1.78***(.211)
Feduc .387***(.025) .342***(.038) .372***(.025) .366***(.024)
Meduc .195***(.042) .196***(.046) .196***(.043) .196***(.043)
Urban 2.64***(.301) 2.01***(.511) 2.44***(.303) 2.35***(.290)
Lnholding .900(.761) .400(.724) .754(.600) .681(.601)
Hincome .010(.010) .005(.008) .008(.006) .008(.006)
IVs F-statistic [12.49] [52.49] [34.36]
Sargan test p-value {.3740}
R2 .4545 .3538 .4441 .4329
Notes: Sample of 25-49 years old and Eastern, Central, Western and Abroad
only. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, **
significant 5%, * significant at 10% level. Mage is treated as endogenous.
IV1: Maithili. IV2: Avmage. Age:25-49 as base category. Regional and
ethnicity dummies are included but not reported.
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